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Viewing cable 09KUWAIT760, GEN PETRAEUS AND KUWAITI DCOS ON IRAN, IRAQ, CT,
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Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09KUWAIT760 | 2009-08-02 06:06 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET | Embassy Kuwait |
VZCZCXRO2565
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKU #0760/01 2140656
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 020656Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3753
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000760
SIPDIS
NEA/ARP, NEA/RA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MOPS KU IZ
SUBJECT: GEN PETRAEUS AND KUWAITI DCOS ON IRAN, IRAQ, CT,
YEMEN AND JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES
REF: KUWAIT 724
Classified By: DCM Tom Williams for reasons 1.4 b and d
¶1. (S) CENTCOM Commander GEN David Petraeus, accompanied by
Ambassador, engaged in a wide-ranging exchange on the evening
of July 22 with Kuwaiti Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff
(DCOS) LTG Ahmed Khalid Al Sabah. Key Points:
-- (C) On Iraq, General Petraeus said the USG appreciates
Kuwait's robust aid for our Iraq efforts; Kuwait's security
remains a top U.S. priority, and we will coordinate closely
on force outflows from Iraq. The U.S. forces relied on
support from Kuwait for our efforts in Afghanistan as well.
Kuwait should remain open to engagement with Iraq as a means
to help resolve disputes between the two countries and help
Iraq achieve greater stability. DCOS Al Sabah responded that
Kuwait seeks to rebuild relations with Iraq and prefers that
negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait on international
disputes be under the UN aegis.
-- (S) On Iran, Kuwait's head of Military Intelligence said
the fate of Iran is in Supreme Leader Khamene'i's hands. He
must either compromise with Ayatollah Rafsanjani or continue
to support President Ahmadinejad. He assessed that the
public had crossed the "fear line," and continued protests
against the government were a possibility. He thought it
would be important to see the Supreme Leader's response to
protests. Continued unrest and government repression may be
the catalyst that provokes Iranian security forces to crack
down, align with the masses, or fracture.
-- (C) On CT, General Petraeus noted USG appreciation for
recent CT actions by Kuwait's Interior Ministry forces, and
said passage of comprehensive anti-terror legislation would
greatly facilitate further efforts.
-- (C) General Petraeus characterized the bilateral security
relationship as strong, and welcomed the upcoming Joint
Military Commission (JMC) in October, as well as Kuwait's
continued participation in joint military exercises.
Iraq
----
¶2. (C) GEN Petraeus thanked the GOK for its support for
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and its facilitation of U.S.
forces deploying and redeploying through Kuwait. He provided
his congratulations on the results of the recent
Parliamentary elections, noting in particular the election of
four U.S.-educated women, and said that it was encouraging to
see Kuwait's recent counter-terrorism progress. Petraeus
also thanked the GOK for its financial, reconstruction, and
moral support for Iraq during OIF. He urged that the GOK
continue to remain open to negotiate disputes between Iraq
and Kuwait, and hoped that such negotiations would be
concluded successfully. He assessed that with assistance
from its Arab neighbors Iraq would "muddle through" towards
stability. Though establishing Iraqi stability absorbs a
great amount of USG focus, he reassured the DCOS that Kuwaiti
security would remain a priority for the U.S., and also
promised that the U.S. would closely coordinate with the GOK
on working through the logistics of support for the
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq through Kuwait. GEN
Petraeus said Iraqi PM Maliki's visit to Washington would
provide an opportunity for discussion on issues of concern to
Kuwait, such as compensation, borders, and recovering the
remains of Kuwaiti prisoners still missing from the 1990
invasion and Iraqi occupation. General Petraeus briefed the
DCOS on levels of violence in Iraq, noting that the surge of
US forces, fighting side-by-side with Iraqi forces that now
number nearly 650,000, has contributed greatly to growing
stability. U.S. combat forces have completed their
withdrawal from Iraqi cities, although advisors and liaison
elements remain along with joint coordination centers in
Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul that provide the Iraqis with access
to U.S. enablers and expertise.
¶3. (C) In response, the DCOS -- who was personally held as a
POW during the Iraqi invasion -- expressed a desire to
rebuild relations with Iraq, but, echoing the policy of the
GOK, said that all Kuwaiti-concerned negotiations with Iraq
should be conducted under the auspices of the UN. GEN
Petraeus informed him, that in a recent conversation with
Vice President Biden, he recommended that former Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General Staffan de Mistura
adjudicate the Iraq/Kuwait dispute.
KUWAIT 00000760 002 OF 002
Iran
----
¶4. (S) BG Abdulrahman al-Hadhood, Chief of Kuwaiti Military
Intelligence, in a frank discussion on Iran, asserted that
the future of Iran, and its relations with its regional
neighbors, is in the hands of Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah
Khamene'i. The direction in which Khamene'i will lead Iran
in this post-presidential election era will largely depend on
whether he forges a compromise with Ayatollah Ali Akbar
Rafsanjani or continues to pull the "puppet strings" of
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Al-Hadhoud said the Iranian
public, in staging mass protests in the wake of the
elections, had "crossed the fear line." The next test for
Iran will be to face the future reactions of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and to what extent the
IRGC, the Basij militia, and the regular army are ordered to
maintain security. He questioned whether the IRGC would hold
ranks with Khamene'i or begin to sympathize with the Iranian
masses should further crackdowns be instigated, as happened
with the Iranian Army when it fractured and many joined the
mass student protests in the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Al-Hadhoud predicted that such a tripwire to tip the balance
would be the arrest of Presidential challenger Mir Housein
Mousavi. The DCOS also mentioned Kuwaiti understanding that
Iran was supporting Shi'a in the Gulf and extremists in
Yemen. GEN Petraeus asked for assistance in determining if
Iran was, in particular, supporting the al-Houthi in Yemen.
¶5. (S) GEN Petraeus assured the DCOS that the US military is
"very capable" and is fully prepared for various
contingencies should unrest escalate or Iran become more
unpredictable. He added that the US military is assisting
Gulf states in shoring up ballistic missile and counter air
defenses, as well as early warning systems in the eventuality
of an Iranian missile launch. He encouraged the GOK to
consider establishing a regional "Center for Excellence for
Air and Missile Defense," -- complementing the UAE's Gulf Air
Warfare Center -- which would focus on air and missile
defense and on the interoperability of systems such as the
PAC-III Kuwait now has deployed.
Counterterrorism
----------------
¶6. (S) GEN Petraeus congratulated the DCOS on the success of
GOK security forces in counterterrorism (CT) operations in
recent months, citing Kuwaiti crackdowns on individuals of
"mutual concern." He conveyed to the DCOS that passage of
comprehensive CT legislation would greatly facilitate further
cooperation in this critical area. General Petraeus observed
that Kuwait, based on its experience with extremists, should
recognize that such elements will ultimately turn to
targeting Kuwait.
Mil-Mil: Joint training and JMC
--------------------------------
¶7. (C) GEN Petraeus told the DCOS that the bilateral Defense
Cooperation Agreement (signed in 1991, renewed in 2001) had
proved mutually beneficial and that the USG is inclined to
renew it in 2011. He also said that he was looking forward
to the October JMC to discuss with Kuwaiti COS LTG Fahad
al-Amir Kuwaiti concerns over the FMS program and the
possibility of creating a regional air and missile
defense center of excellence in Kuwait. He also noted the
receipt and approval of a Kuwaiti request for an avionics and
weapon systems upgrade, and encouraged Kuwaiti participation
in joint military exercises like Eager Mace and Bright Star.
He also offered to help in the coordination of an Eagle
Resolve exercise, should the GOK desire to host it. In
addition, he encouraged Kuwait to send its special operations
forces to Jordan's King Abdullah II Special Operations
Training Center and its fighter-attack aircraft to the UAE's
Gulf Air Warfare Training Center.
¶8. (U) GEN Petraeus has cleared this cable.
********************************************* *********
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
visit Kuwait's Classified Website at:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Kuwa it
********************************************* *********
WILLIAMS