Currently released so far... 1295 / 251,287
Articles
Browse latest releases
2010/12/10
2010/12/09
2010/12/08
2010/12/07
2010/12/06
2010/12/05
2010/12/04
2010/12/03
2010/12/02
2010/12/01
2010/11/30
2010/11/29
2010/11/28
Browse by creation date
Browse by origin
Embassy Asuncion
Embassy Astana
Embassy Asmara
Embassy Ashgabat
Embassy Ankara
Embassy Amman
Embassy Algiers
Embassy Addis Ababa
Embassy Abuja
Embassy Abu Dhabi
Embassy Abidjan
Embassy Buenos Aires
Embassy Bucharest
Embassy Brussels
Embassy Bridgetown
Embassy Brasilia
Embassy Bogota
Embassy Bishkek
Embassy Berlin
Embassy Belgrade
Embassy Beirut
Embassy Beijing
Embassy Bangkok
Embassy Bamako
Embassy Baku
Embassy Baghdad
Embassy Colombo
Embassy Chisinau
Embassy Caracas
Embassy Cairo
Consulate Casablanca
Consulate Cape Town
Embassy Dushanbe
Embassy Dublin
Embassy Doha
Embassy Djibouti
Embassy Damascus
Embassy Dakar
Consulate Dubai
Embassy Kyiv
Embassy Kuwait
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Embassy Kigali
Embassy Khartoum
Embassy Kampala
Embassy Kabul
Embassy Luxembourg
Embassy Luanda
Embassy London
Embassy Lisbon
Embassy Lima
Embassy La Paz
Consulate Lagos
Mission USNATO
Embassy Muscat
Embassy Moscow
Embassy Mexico
Embassy Maputo
Embassy Manama
Embassy Managua
Embassy Madrid
Consulate Munich
Embassy Pristina
Embassy Pretoria
Embassy Prague
Embassy Port Au Prince
Embassy Paris
Embassy Panama
Consulate Peshawar
Secretary of State
Embassy Stockholm
Embassy Sofia
Embassy Skopje
Embassy Singapore
Embassy Seoul
Embassy Sarajevo
Embassy Santiago
Embassy San Salvador
Embassy Sanaa
Consulate Shenyang
Consulate Shanghai
Consulate Sao Paulo
Embassy Tunis
Embassy Tripoli
Embassy The Hague
Embassy Tel Aviv
Embassy Tehran
Embassy Tegucigalpa
Embassy Tbilisi
Embassy Tallinn
Browse by tag
CH
CA
CD
CV
COUNTER
CO
CY
CDG
CU
CE
CASC
CJAN
CS
CACM
CDB
CM
CLINTON
CIA
CMGT
COUNTERTERRORISM
CI
CVIS
CG
CF
CN
EPET
EINV
ENRG
ECON
EFIN
ETTC
EU
EAID
EN
ELAB
EG
EAGR
EWWT
EIND
ETRD
ES
ECUN
EUN
EMIN
EAIR
ET
EINDETRD
EUC
ELTN
EC
ECPS
ER
EZ
ECIP
ENVR
EFIS
EXTERNAL
EI
ELECTIONS
EINVEFIN
EINT
EREL
KNNP
KPAL
KS
KNPP
KTFN
KISL
KGHG
KSCA
KV
KDEM
KSPR
KU
KPAO
KJUS
KCOR
KCRM
KACT
KBIO
KN
KAWK
KIPR
KHLS
KIRF
KGIC
KRAD
KMDR
KAWC
KPWR
KG
KFIN
KOLY
KWBG
KSUM
KPIN
KTIP
KDRG
KCOM
KTIA
KPKO
KE
KZ
KDEMAF
KWMN
KR
KSEC
KDEV
KHIV
KCIP
KIFR
KGCC
KPRP
KUNR
KNUC
KFRD
KMCA
KWAC
KCFE
MO
MY
MCAP
MARR
MASS
MIL
MOPS
ML
MR
MNUC
MA
MTCRE
MEPP
MAR
MAPP
MU
MD
MZ
MX
MOPPS
MASC
MG
MK
MTCR
MPOS
MCC
MP
PREL
PINS
PINR
PTER
PGOV
PHUM
PL
PARM
POL
PBTS
PHSA
PK
PM
PSOE
PREF
PAK
PE
PROP
PU
POLITICAL
PARTIES
PSI
PA
PINT
PO
PGOF
POLITICS
PECON
PEPR
PBIO
POGOV
PINL
Browse by classification
Community resources
courage is contagious
Viewing cable 09STATE14577, ACTION REQUEST: RUSSIA S-300 MISSILE TO IRAN
If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs
Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09STATE14577.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
---|---|---|---|---|
09STATE14577 | 2009-02-18 00:12 | 2010-11-28 18:06 | SECRET | Secretary of State |
VZCZCXYZ0012
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #4577 0490046
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 180030Z FEB 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 014577
SIPDIS
SECRET/NOFORN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL RS BA KU AE EG JO IS IR
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: RUSSIA S-300 MISSILE TO IRAN
REF: MOSCOW 357
Classified By: NEA Acting A/S Jeffrey Feltman: Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (SBU) This is an action request for Posts in Abu Dhabi,
Amman, Cairo, Kuwait City, Manama, and Riyadh. Please see
para 7.
Summary and Background
------------------------------------------
¶2. (C) Posts are requested to raise with appropriate
government officials our concerns about Russian plans to
transfer the S-300 long-range air-defense system to Iran.
Washington would like these governments to immediately and
directly raise this issue with their Russian counterparts
arguing that such a transfer could significantly enhance
Iran's air defense capability; increase regional instability;
and reward Iran at a time when Iran is undermining security
with its nuclear pursuits and support for terrorism.
¶3. (S//NF) Over the past few years, the Russian Government
has told the USG that, while it has a contract to supply the
S-300 air-defense system to Iran, the transfer would not be
completed until Iran complied with its international nuclear
obligations. USG suspicions were piqued during a February 12
meeting when Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov brushed off U/S
Burns concerns over such a transfer, but did not reiterate
Russia,s year-long position that the S-300 transfer depends
on Iranian behavior. The Iranian Defense Minister is
currently in Moscow for talks with Russia on the delivery of
the S-300. Initial press reports quote Rosoboronexport
officials as saying there has been no progress in the talks
to expedite delivery of the system. Russian news media also
speculates that Russia will not deliver the S-300 to Iran for
fear of upsetting discussions with the new US administration.
Despite the denials in the press, we are concerned by the
technical preparations for delivery of the S-300, which are
complete or nearing completion. It appears that there is a
need for action now to prevent a senior-level political
decision to allow the delivery to go foward.
¶4. (C) Though Russia states that the S-300 is "defensive" in
nature, the mobile system could be used to support offensive
operations. S-300s located on Iranian territory would have
the range to engage targets well beyond Iran,s borders into
Persian Gulf and Iraqi airspace, threatening U.S. and
regional partners.
¶5. (SBU) UNSCR 1747, passed on March 24, 2007, urged all
states to exercise "vigilance and restraint in the supply,
sale or transfer" of a broad range of conventional weapons as
defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register on
Conventional Arms to Iran. While the S-300 does not
technically meet the definition within the UN Register for
any of the categories of items listed in paragraph 6 of UNSCR
1747, transfers of this type of system to Iran seriously
undercut the primary objective of UNSCR 1747 to further press
Iran to comply with the UNSCR 1737 requirement to suspend its
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and cooperate
fully with the IAEA.
¶6. (C) We have selected action addressee posts to engage the
GOR because we maintain strong bilateral relationships and
share common security interests, but also because we believe
these governments have potential leverage with Russia. In
particular, Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have
increased their political-military cooperation with Russia.
These countries can legitimately make the point to Moscow
that they cannot have a close political-military partnership
with Russia, while Russia strengthens the hand of Iran,
arguably the greatest threat to each of these nation's
security.
Suggested Talking Points
-----------------------------------------
¶7. (SBU) Posts are requested to approach appropriate host
government officials regarding the possible transfer of the
S-300 air-defense system from Russia to Iran. Post should
draw from the following talking points.
--In the spirit of our bilateral cooperation, we request your
government,s support in urging Russia to not transfer a
highly sophisticated air defense system to Iran.
--In 2005 Russia signed a contract to sell the modern
long-range S-300 air defense missile system to Iran.
-- In 2006, after it was exposed that Iran was not in
compliance with its international nuclear obligations, Russia
assured us, it would not complete the transfer until Iran
changed course.
--Despite these assurances, we are concerned that Russia is
in a position to deliver the S-300 to Iran as soon as a
political decision is taken.
--Moreover, when we raised our concerns in recent
senior-level conversations with Russian officials, we were
not reassured by the Russian response.
--We request that you use your influence with Russia to
sharpen their decision against a transfer at this time.
--Though Russia has categorized the S-300 as defensive in
nature, it is a mobile system that can easily used to support
offensive operations.
--The most modern variant of the S-300, high-performance
surface-to-air missile system would greatly improve Iran,s
ability to defend large regions of its airspace up to 200 km
beyond its borders.
--With Iran in non-compliance of its international nuclear
obligations and continued meddling in regional affairs, this
is not the time for Russia to engage in arms sales with
Tehran.
-- We are also concerned about the implications of the
transfer of an air defense system to Iran. Such transfers
would undercut the broad objective of UNSCR 1747 to increase
pressure on Iran to suspend its proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities and cooperate fully with the IAEA by
denying arms transfers to Iran.
--(If appropriate) We believe you have particular leverage
given your expanded military cooperation with Russia. You
can legitimately argue that Moscow cannot be true partners in
the political-military realm while simultaneously
strengthening Iran, which is arguably the greatest threat to
your nation,s security.
End Talking Points
CLINTON